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CHAPTER

I.

INTRODUCTION.

How to determine the relation between religion and

state is one of main themes in the modern constitutional

Although the free exercise of religion is protected

law.

by most of the constitutional laws in the world,

the

relation among them differs even in the Western
countries.'^

The United Kingdom,

its state church

for instance,

(the Church of England)

,

establishes

while in Germany

churches are given the official status to serve "an

important role in the nation's public life."^

In the

United States, as well as in France and Japan, the

Constitution prohibits government from establishing

a

state church or religion.'^
In the type of the United States,

the separation

between religion and state would run afoul of the free

All translations from Japanese to English are the
author's unless otherwise indicated.

See Koichi Yokota, The Separation of Religion and
in Japanese Constitutional Law 2 05 (Percy R. Luney, Jr.
Kazuyuki Takahashi eds
1993).
""

State,
&

.

,

Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the
Federal Republic of Germany 445 (198 9)
^

.

See U.S. Const, amend. I; Law of Dec. 9, 1905
(France), C.adm. 787 (1994);
Kenpo (Japan), art. 20, para.
^

.

exercise of religion,''

To avoid this conflict,

some

commentators suggested several possible results; that is,
to prefer either the free exercise of religion,

separation of religion and state to the other.

^

or the

The

concept of religious accommodation is one of those
results, which the Supreme Court of the United States has

recognized.^

According to Professor Michael W. McConnell,

who is the strongest advocate of accommodation,
" [a]

ccommodation refers to government laws or policies

that have the purpose and effect of removing
or facilitating the exercise of,

institution's religion."''

a

person'

In this view,

s

a

burden on,

or an

the main parts of

religious freedom are "the autonomy of the religious
institutions, individual choice in matters of religion.
See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-669
(1970); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion,
1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (" [S] ometimes separation enhances
"^

religious liberty and sometimes separation diminishes
it.")

.

See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone et al.. Constitutional Law
(3d ed. 1996); Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Constitutional Law 14 67 (13th ed. 1997)
^

1613

.

Walz V. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)
("there is room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise
to exist without sponsorship and without interference.")
^

Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 685, 686 (1992); see also id. at 717-718 ("This kind
of ^favoritism toward religion,' however, is inherent in
the very text of the First Amendment.
[If] the
Establishment Clause prohibits the advancement of
religion, and if extending special constitutional
protection to free exercise advances religion, then the
Religion Clauses are contradictory.").

.

3

and the freedom to put

Moreover,

practice."^

a

chosen faith

(if any)

the separation of religion and

state is seen in this view as "subsidiary,

values in

...

into

religious liberty."^

instrumental,

Although this position

could be against the strict separation of religion and
state,

it would not sacrifice people's religious freedom.

What is the difference between accommodating religion
and favoring religion?

One commentator explains it in

particularly clear fashion.
"religious purpose" is not the same
as a "purpose of accommodating religious
beliefs." If someone does something for a
she does it
"religious purpose," then
because her religious beliefs encourage her
to do it and because she thinks that those
beliefs are valid.
Thus, one goes to church
or says grace before meals for a religious
Likewise, when a legislature
purpose.
requires schoolchildren to read the Bible, it
generally does so for a religious purpose:
not simply because it thinks that class
discipline will benefit from the practice,
but also
because it thinks that
Christianity is the true religion and that
children should learn about it for the
betterment of their souls.
Yet any given
accommodation of religion may not have a
religious purpose.
If someone invites ten
people over to dinner and two of them are
Hindu, he will probably go out of his way to
stock his refrigerator with something besides
hamburgers and hot dogs.
Yet he does this
regardless of, not because of, his own
[A]

...

...

McConnell, supra note

4,

at

1

(footnote omitted)

at 2.
Note that the Japanese Supreme Court also recognizes
the separation of religion and state as an institutional
guarantee of religious liberty, see infra text
accompanying note 230.
^

Id.

.

He does it not because he
religious beliefs.
thinks that his Hindu friends' religious
beliefs are true, but simply because
accommodating their religious scruples is a
[Accommodating
respectful thing to do.
religious believers] simply reflects the
government's secular respect for their right
to choose their way of life.'^^

I

believe that the value of free exercise of religion

surpasses the value of the separation of religion and
state.

However,

facilitating the religious value should

not exceed the limit of the Religious Clause.

^"^

Furthermore, government has discretion whether to take

alternative burden on religious beneficiaries to assure
not to give religion an excessive favor over non-religion.
In this thesis,

discuss the extent to which

I

government can afford to give accommodation within the
limits of the Establishment Clause.

In Chapter II,

I

review the theory of the permissible accommodation

referred in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Chapter III,

I

accommodation.

In

examine scholarly debates on the
Then,

I

discuss German and Japanese law of

the accommodation in Chapter IV.

There,

those cases

suggest the possibility of alternative burdens on

religious believers.

The alternative burdens are

"^

Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The Free Exercise
Boundaries of Permissible Accommodation Under the
Establishment Clause, 99 Yale L.J. 1127, 1135-1136 (1990)
(footnote omitted)
^^

The Constitution of the United States provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
." U.S. Const, amend. I.
exercise thereof
The former is
...

.

5

considered the price of the accommodation.

I

conclude

that government has authority to determine whether to

confer accommodation to religion, and discretion to take

alternative burden, which is non-religious burden imposed
by government to those who receive accommodating benefits.

Those government decisions are subject to courts that

examine whether the decisions violate the Establishment
Clause

called the Establishment Clause, and the latter is the
Free Exercise Clause.

.

CHAPTER II.

ACCOMMODATION TO RELIGION IN THE SUPREME

COURT.

As the U.S.

Clauses
[them]

,

Supreme Court stated,

are cast in absolute terms,

...

"[the]

and either of

if expanded to a logical extreme,

clash with the other.
collision.

"'"^

two Religion

would tend to

This might be an inevitable

As described above,

commentators have

suggested several solutions to reconcile

it.''"^

Accommodation to religion, which stresses the value of the
free exercise of religion preference over non-

establishment value,

'^'^

is useful to resolve the conflict,

and is what the Supreme Court has always relied on cases

12

Walz V. Tax Comm'n,

13

See supra text accompanying note

14

397 U.S.

664,

668-669

(1970)

5,

See, e.g.. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812
(1983) (Brenann, J., dissenting) ("[0]ur cases recognize
that, in one important respect, the Constitution is not
neutral on the subject of religion: Under the Free
Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims of
conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that
other strongly-held beliefs do not."); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The solution to the conflict between the
Religion Clauses lies
in identifying workable limits to
the government's license to promote the free exercise of
...

religion.

")

it needs to confront the conflict.

^^

The Court has surely

recognized the need of religious accommodations

"
.

Professor Tribe indicates that there are three types
of accommodation:

required, permissible,

and forbidden

'^
.

The required accommodation is that the Free Exercise

Clause requires government to make some accommodations to

religious believers,

^^

such as excusing them from

compulsory program of public education,

^^

or including in

unemployment compensation those who were fired because of
their belief.

^°

The permissible accommodation is that the

Establishment Clause permits government to accommodate
religion while the Free Exercise Clause does not require
doing

so.^"^

This involves cases such as building

in a public university premise,

^^

a

church

allowing drug consumption

See infra text accompanying notes 71-106.

^^

Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
144-145 (1987) ("This Court has long recognized that
the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate
religious practices and that it may do so without
violating the Establishment Clause.").
136,

'''

5,

See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14at 1169 (2d ed. 1988)
.

"^

Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation,
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 743, 751 (1992)
Ira C.

.

^^

See Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205

^°

(1972).

See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Thomas v. Review Bd
450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Com'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
.

^^

Lupu,

,

supra note 18, at 751.

60

)

for religious sacraments,

^^

or exempting conscientious

objectors from obligatory military services. ^^

The

forbidden accommodation is what the Establishment Clause

prohibits government to do, such as

direct subsidy to

a

religion, or tax exemption only for religion.
In this chapter,

^^

examine permissible accommodation

I

cases in the Supreme Court.

A.

Emergence of Accommodation in the Court.
Zorach

Clauson^^ is the case that "[t]he concept

v.

of accommodation

opinion.

"^^

...

first appeared in

a

Supreme Court

This was the case with respect to the

constitutionality of

a

"released time" program in public

schools that allowed students to attend religious classes

held outside the school premises during school day.

Upholding the program. Justice Douglas said for the Court
that the separation of religion and state should not be a
^^

See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1992); Ariz. Rev.
§§ 13-3402 (B) 1) - (3) (1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
12-22-317(3) (1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4116 (c) 8
(1985); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-6 (D) (Supp.1989); Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-3 (3) (1986)
Ann.

Stat.

(

(

.

With respect to the history of the religious
exemption from military service, see generally United
States V. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 632-633 (1931) (Hughes,
C.J., dissenting); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
169-173 (1965)
See also Kommers, supra note 2, 462-466
(German conscientious objection statutes).
^"^

.

^^

See Texas Monthly,

Inc.

v.

Bullock,

1989'

"

343 U.S.

^^

McConnell,

306

(1952)

supra note

4,

at

4

489 U.S.

1

.

rigorous one

^^
.

Rather,

"[w]hen the state encourages

religious instruction or cooperates with religious

authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people

and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs.

"2^

In Sherbert v.

Verner,^^ the Court denied government

exclusion from unemployment compensation of

a

religious

believer who was fired because of her religious
observance.

It changed its course toward the Free

Exercise Clause"^° to mandate government to make some

^^

Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312 (''The First Amendment
does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
Rather, it studiously
a separation of Church and State.
defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there
shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the
other.
That is the common sense of the matter.
Otherwise
the state and religion would be aliens to each other hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.").
...

28

Id.

29

374 U.S.

30

at 313-314.
398

(1963

See, e.g., Reynolds v. United Sates, 98 U.S. 145
(1878); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940)
In these cases, the Court suggested that the free
exercise claim could not be superior to the government
interest to keep general applicability of the law which
maintained the social order.
See also Employment Div., v
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (''[T]he right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).'" (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
.

judgment)

)

)

.

.
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exemptions on generally applicable laws against religious
claims.

Three Justices indicated their approval for

permissible legislative accommodation.

Saying that when

there was conflict between the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause,

the Establishment Clause should

yield its way to the Free Exercise Clause,

^^

Justice

Stewart stated in his concurrence that "our Constitution

commands the positive protection by government of

religious Freedom
-

-

not only for a minority,

not only for the majority,

of us.""^^

however large

-

however small
but for each

Justice Harlan also showed his affirmative

position for permissible accommodation in his dissent,
which Justice White joined.

^"^

Justice Brennan suggested his acceptance of

permissible accommodation in School Dist. of Abington

^•^

(Stewart,

J.,

concurring in the

at 416 (Stewart,
(emphasis added)

J.,

concurring in the

Id.

at 415

v.

judgment)
^^

judgment)
^^

Id.

Id. at 423 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is,
believe, enough flexibility in the Constitution to
permit a legislative judgment accommodating [religion].");
see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 359 n.9
(1970) ("My own conclusion, to which I still adhere, is
that [a] State could constitutionally create exceptions to
its program to accommodate religious scruples.
That
suggestion must, however, be qualified by the observation
that any such exception in order to satisfy the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, would have to
be sufficiently broad to be religiously neutral.").
I

.

.

.
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Schempp,^^ where the Court invalidated Bible reading in

public schools. Six categories of cases "to be treated

distinctly with regard to the level of accommodation

permissible under the Constitution"^^ were offered by him.
The first category is the conflict between the

Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, where
government's strict religious separation policy might
infringe individual's right of the free exercise.

^^

Secondly, Justice Brennan discussed religious exercises in

legislative bodies, and said that since the member of
legislature are all matured, this sort of religious
exercise does not cause any Establishment Clause
concern.

^^

Third,

the Justice permitted non-devotional

use of religious matters in the public schools,

such as

referring to religion or "differences between religious
^^

374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[N]ot every involvement of religion in
public life violates the Establishment Clause.").

Kristin M. Engstrom, Comment, Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence the Souring of Lemon and the Search
for a New Test, 27 Pac. L.J. 121, 147 (1995) (footnote
omitted)
^^

:

^^

Schempp,
concurring)

374 U.S.

at 296-299

(Brennan,

J.,

Id. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795-796
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (" [D] isagreement with the Court
requires that I confront the fact that some 20 years ago,
in a concurring opinion in one of the cases striking down
official prayer and ceremonial Bible reading in the public
schools, I came very close to endorsing essentially the
result reached by the Court today.
Nevertheless, after
much reflection, I have come to the conclusion that I was
wrong then and that the Court is wrong today." (footnote
omitted)
"^"^

)

.

.
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sects"^^ as social and historical matters.

The fourth

category is uniform tax exemptions incidentally available
to religious institutions,

in which "religious

institutions simply share benefits which government makes

generally available to educational, charitable, and

eleemosynary groups

."^^

Justice Brennan regarded

religious considerations in public welfare programs as the
fifth category.

There are programs in which government

could include individuals whose demands are religiously

motivated in nondiscriminatory welfare programs, such as
unemployment compensation programs.

^^

Schempp,
concurring)

374 U.S.

at 300

'^°

The sixth category

(Brennan,

J.,

^^

Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring)
See
generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(property tax exemption); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (tax deduction for educational expenses).
.

Schempp, 374 U.S. at 302-303 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)
See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobble
(1963); Thomas v. Review Bd
V. Unemployment Appeals Com'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
See
also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (religious use
in public university facilities); Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(financial vocational assistance for a blind student);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (grant program for
teenage sexuality counseling); Board of Educ of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(religious use in public high school facilities); Lamb's
Chapel V. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993) (religiously oriented use in public
school facilities); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, (1993) (providing interpreter for deaf
students); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va
115
S.Ct. 2510 (1995) (financial assistance for public
university students activities)
''°

.

,

.

.

,

.

.
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consisted of activities which, though religious in origin,
have ceased to have religious meaning,
"In God We Trust" in currency,

Christmas trees.

^^

or the public display of

He had recognized that the boundary of

accommodation should "accord
reflect

such as the motto

[]

with history and faithfully

the understanding of the Founding Fathers.

[]

For Justice Brennan,

"^^

denying religious accommodation

such as the refusal of "chaplains and places of worship
for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all

civilian opportunities for public communion, the

withholding of draft exemptions for ministers and
conscientious objectors, or the denial of the temporary
use of an empty public building to

a

congregation whose

place of worship has been destroyed by fire or flood,

"^^

could be hostility toward religion.''''

^^

Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303-304
concurring)
^^

(Brennan,

J.,

at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also
(Goldberg, J., concurring)
Justice Brennan described what the Founders wanted to
prohibit were "those involvements of religious with
secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially
religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ
the organs of government for essentially religious
purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends, where secular means would suffice," Id.
at 295.
See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681,
686-687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
id.

Id.

at 306

''^

''

Id.

at 299

(Brennan,

J.,

concurring)

.

Id,

Nevertheless, Justice Brennan did not intend to
suggest that "government must provide chaplains or draft
exemptions, or that the courts should intercede if it
fails to do so," Id.
It seems he also recognized then

.

.

.
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Walz

V.

Tax Comm'n'^^ is another case in which the

Court mentioned accommodation.

Upholding property tax

exemption policy to religious organizations as well as
educational and charitable organizations, Chief Justice
Burger said in his majority opinion that government

accommodation covered much

a

wider area than that mandated

by the Free Exercise Clause through courts.''^

Justice

Burger also mentioned tradition and national heritage that
could be the limit of permissible accommodation
In McDaniel v.

47

Paty,^^ although the majority did not

say anything about permissible accommodation,

Justice

Brennan restated his opinion with respect to it.
case,

In that

the Court struck down a State constitutional

provision that excluded clergymen from elected public
office.

In his concurring opinion.

Justice Brennan

reiterated his reliance on 7\merican history, tradition,
and heritage that would be the limit of permissible
accommodation.''^

There, he perceived that the structure

that it was a government's discretion to decide whether it
needed to make an exemption for religious believers.
"^

397 U.S.

664,

(1970)

^^

Id. at 673 ("The limits of permissible state
accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive
with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause.")
''

Id.

"^

435 U.S.

^^

618

(1978)

Id. at 638 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[T]he Court's decisions have indicated that
the limits of permissible governmental action with respect
to religion under the Establishment Clause must reflect an

.

.
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of the Religious Clauses allows government "to take

religion into account when necessary to further secular

purposes unrelated to the advancement of religion, and to
exempt, when possible,

from generally applicable

governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an

atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.

"^°

Since the 1980s, the Court has taken further steps to

allow permissible government accommodation.

In Lynch v.

Donnelly^^ where the Court validated a display of the

nativity scene (creche) owned by local government in

a

park with other Christmas decorations. Chief Justice

Burger said for the majority: "[n]or does the Constitution
require complete separation of church and state; it

affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any."^^

Justice Burger believed that to permit this

religious display in holiday seasons was an accommodation

appropriate accommodation of our heritage as a religious
people whose freedom to develop and preach religious ideas
and practices is protected by the Free Exercise Clause."
(footnote omitted)
)

^°

Id.

at 639

(Brennan,

J.,

concurring in the

judgment)
^^

465 U.S.

^^

Id.

668

at 673

(1984)

(citation omitted!

16
to religion justified by history and longstanding

traditions

^^
.

Justice Brennan later outlined his new approach

toward his six categories of government accommodation in
School Dist. of Abington
theory,

v.

Schempp.^^

In refining his

Justice Brennan said that there are three

principles derived from the Court's precedents that permit
government to acknowledge religion under the Establishment
Clause.

^^

First,

government "may, consistently with the

"

Id. at 675-677 ("Our history is replete with
official references to the value and invocation of Divine
guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the
[Our] history
Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders.
is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs ....
Equally pervasive is the evidence of accommodation of all
faiths and all forms of religious expression, and
hostility toward none."); see also id. at 686 ("It would
be ironic, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol of
a particular historic religious event, as part of a
celebration acknowledged in the Western World for 20
centuries, and in this country by the people, by the
Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two
centuries, would so 'taint' the City's exhibit as to
render it violative of the Establishment Clause.
To
forbid the use of this one passive symbol - the creche at the very time people are taking note of the season with
Christmas hymns and carols in public schools and other
public places, and while the Congress and Legislatures
open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains would be a
stilted overreaction contrary to our history and to our
holdings.
If the presence of the creche in this display
violates the Establishment Clause, a host of other forms
of taking official note of Christmas, and of our religious
heritage, are equally offensive to the Constitution.").
^^

^^

See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 715 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[I]t appears from our prior decisions that at least
three principles - tracing the narrow channels which
government acknowledgments must follow to satisfy the
Establishment Clause - may be identified.").

.
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Establishment Clause, act to accommodate to some extent
the opportunities of individuals to practice their

religion," even though to do so is not mandated by the
Free Exercise Clause.

In this principle,

^^

government has

some latitudes to decide whether or not to give

accommodation to religion beyond the Free Exercise
Clause.

^^

Second,

"while

a

particular governmental

practice may have derived from religious motivations and
retain certain religious connotations,

it is nonetheless

permissible for the government to pursue the practice when
it is continued today solely for secular reasons. "^^

To

uphold Sunday closing laws or to cerebrate Thanksgiving
Day officially may be justified in this principle.

Thirdly, government may recognize

^'the

^^

religious beliefs

and practices of the American people as an aspect of our

national history and culture" in its official actions

without violating the Establishment Clause.
to Justice Brennan,

have practiced repeatedly for

56

Id (citation omitted)

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

at 715-716

Id.

at 716

omitted)

According

if referring to religion or

acknowledging it gives solemnity to

60

^°

a

(Brennan,

(Brennan,

J.,

a

public ceremony and

long time, those practices

J.,

dissenting).

dissenting)

(citation

.
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would have lost religious meaning and serve some cultural
functions

^^
.

In the next year,

the Court held in Wallace

v.

Jaffree^^ that a legislature could not amend a school

meditation law to install

a

word "prayer."

In her

concurrence, Justice O'Connor showed her agreement to
She stated that although the

permissible accommodation.

Free Exercise Clause does not require government to make
an exemption for "persons from some generally applicable

government requirements so as to permit those persons to
freely exercise their religion,

"^^

it is the teaching of

the precedents that "the government in some circumstances

may voluntarily choose to exempt religious observers
without violating the Establishment Clause."^''

In so

Justice O'Connor did not rely on neutrality toward

saying.

religion to solve the conflict between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

^^

Instead,

she said,

it would be very important to identify "workable limits to
Id. at 716-717 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The practices
by which the government has long acknowledged religion are
therefore probably necessary to serve certain secular
functions, and that necessity, coupled with their long
history, gives those practices an essentially secular
meaning ")
^"^

.

.

"

472 U.S.

^^

Id.

judgment

.

(O'Connor,
(O'Connor
(citation omitted)

J.,

concurring in the

(O'Connor,

J.,

concurring in the

Id.

judgment)
65
^^

(1985)

at 81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
(citation omitted).

judgment)
64
^^

38

Id.

at 82

at 83

.

.

.

.
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the government's license to promote the free exercise of

religion,

"^^

Justice O'Connor developed her "endorsement

test"^^ to apply to permissible accommodation cases,

^^

and

argued that if government policies seem to be

accommodation by pursuing "[the]
values when [they]

lift[]

a

Free Exercise Clause

government-imposed burden on

the free exercise of religion,

"^^

the Free Exercise Clause

justifies "the religious purpose of" government
70

policies
1

B.

•

•

The Accommodation Argument in the Current Court.
By the middle of 1982s,

the Court has begun to take

permissible accommodation issues into account.

''

Id.

^^

The endorsement test is a scrutiny for the
Establishment Clause that "examine [s] whether government's
purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute
actually conveys a message of endorsement" in the view of
the objective observer, who must know the Religious
Clauses and background of the case. Id. at 69 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment); see also Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-689 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)
^^

472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring
("The endorsement test does not preclude
government from acknowledging religion or from taking
religion into account in making law and policy.")

Wallace,
in the judgment)

^^

Id.

judgment)
'°

Id.

at 83

(O'Connor,

J.,

concurring in the

.
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Estate of Thornton

v.

Caldor,

Inc.'^^

was the first

modern case in which the Court dealt with the government

accommodation issue.

the constitutionality

In this case,

of a state law that absolutely mandated an employer to

accommodate an employee's designated Sabbath in its
Chief Justice Burger

working schedule was challenged.

concluded for the Court that this obligatory requirement
over the employer to accommodate one's religious need

could not be seen as permissible government accommodation
so that it violated the Establishment Clause.

doing,

In so

the Court said that because "the statute takes no

account of the convenience or interests of the employer or
those of other employees who do not observe

a

Sabbath,

"^^

"[t]his unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers
over all other interests contravenes

principle of the Religion Clauses
in her concurring opinion,

"'^'^
.

fundamental

a

Justice O'Connor,

tried to distinguish the

statute here from "the religious accommodation provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"''^ stating

^^

'^

^^

472 U.S.

703

Id.

at 709

Id.

at 710.

(1985)

^^

Id. at 711 (O'Connor, J.,
See Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified as
2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV
These provisions prescribe as

concurring)
No. 88-352, 78
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§

Pub.

L.

1992)).
follows:

It shall be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer
to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or
...

.
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that "[s]ince Title VII calls for reasonable rather than

absolute accommodation and extends that requirement to all

religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting
only the Sabbath observance,

I

believe an objective

observer would perceive it as an anti- discrimination law
rather than an endorsement of religion or

religious practice.

particular

a

"^^

In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.

Amos,^^ the

Court was again concerned with an accommodation statute.
It affirmed a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964^^ which "exempts religious organizations from

privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
The term "religion" includes all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the

employer's business.
42 U.S.C.

§

2000e(j)

(1988

^^

Estate of Thornton,
concurring)
"^^

483 U.S.

327

(1987)

Supp.

IV 1992).

472 U.S.

at 712

&

(O'Connor,

J.,

.

^^

The provision at issue prescribes: "[The nonreligious discrimination provision (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964)] shall not apply
to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-l (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
...

22
[an

anti-discrimination provision] in employment on the

basis of religion.

"^^

For the majority.

Justice White

said that "there is ample room for accommodation of

religion under the Establishment Clause.

perceived that "[w]here
purpose of lifting

a

...

"^^

The Court

government acts with the proper

regulation that burdens the exercise

we see no reason to require that the

of religion,

exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular
entities.

"^°

Furthermore, the Court stated that an

accommodation statute should not be the subject of strict
scrutiny if it passes the Lemon

test.^'^

Instead,

the

Court continued, it is sufficient to apply the rational-

based scrutiny that inquires into "the legitimate purpose
of alleviating significant governmental interference with

the ability of religious organizations to define and carry

out their religious missions.

"^^

In her concurrence,

Justice O'Connor again proposed her "endorsement test"
over the Lemon test for the test, evaluating whether an

78

79

80

Amos,
Id.

483 U.S.

at 329.

at 338.

Id.

81

Id. at 339 ("In cases
where a statute is
neutral on its face and motivated by a permissible purpose
of limiting governmental interference with the exercise of
religion, we see no justification for applying strict
scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test.")
For the Lemon test, see infra note 134.
...

.

''

Id.

.

.

.
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accommodation statute is permissible under the
Establishment Clause.

^"^

Texas Monthly, Inc.

Court struck down

a

v.

Bullock^'^ was the case the

State sales tax exemption law that

only applied to religious periodicals.

articulated
a

a

Justice Brennan

criterion for deciding whether

a

statute or

government action is permissible accommodation to

religion or impermissible preference of religion.

Under

^^

Justice Brennan said that government can

his criterion,

"is conferred

give

a

benefit based on religion if it

upon

a

wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as

(1)

religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate
secular end,"^^

(2)

is "designed to alleviate government

intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of

a

particular faith from conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause,

"^"^

or

(3)

"did not, or would not,

impose

substantial burdens on nonbenef iciaries while allowing
others to act according to their religious belief s."^^
This could be

a

test to evaluate whether statute or

government action seems as permissible accommodation.
^^

Id,

at 348

(O'Connor,

J.,

As

concurring in the

judgment)
^^

^^

489 U.S.
Id.

McConnell,

1,

38

(plurality opinion)
supra note 7, at 698-705.

Texas Monthly,
(footnote omitted)
Id.

''

Id.

.

at 11-15

^^

^^

(1989)

at 18 n.8

489 U.S.

at 14

;

see also

(plurality opinion;

(plurality opinion)
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one commentator has stated,

position

...

this test "repudiates the

that the political branches have no discretion

to institute accommodations that are not constitutionally

compelled by the Free Exercise Clause."®^

However,

the

first prong of Justice Brennan's test is "not easy to

reconcile with"^° the precedents since the Court did
decide in Amos that religious accommodation should not be

"packaged with benefits to secular entities.

"^^

Note also

that Justice Brennan finally dropped his reliance on the

tradition, and heritage of America as the limit

history,

of permissible accommodation.

Justice Kennedy proposed his own standard to decide
the limits of permissible accommodation in County of

Allegheny

v.

American Civil Liberties Union,

Court struck down
and approved

a

a

creche,

'^^

standing alone in

where the
a

courthouse

large Chanukah menorah placed outside a

government building with

a

Christmas tree.

In his

concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia joined. Justice Kennedy said that there are
two limits to permissible accommodation:

[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its

^^

McConnell,

supra note

at 709.

7,

^°

Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court'': Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 373,
388.
^^

327,

338
^^

Corporation of Presiding Bishop
(1987)

.

492 U.S.

573,

659

(1989)

.

v.

Amos,

483 U.S,

s

.
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exercise;
and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference,
give direct benefits to religion in such a
degree that it in fact "establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so. "^3

In his noncoercive theory,

on American history,

Justice Kennedy relied heavily

traditions, and national heritage as

the elements to judge whether a government action seems to

violate the Establishment Clause.^''
In Lee v.

Weisman,'^^ where the Court invalidated

school prayer in a graduation ceremony of

a

public school,

Justice Souter stated that religious accommodation must be

evaluated by government neutrality toward religion,

^^

He

Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
^^

See id. at 662-663 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Noncoercive
government action within the realm of flexible
accommodation or passive acknowledgment of existing
symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless
it benefits religion in a way more direct and more
substantial than practices that are accepted in our
national heritage."); id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
principles of the Establishment Clause and our Nation'
historic traditions of diversity and pluralism allow
communities to make reasonable judgments respecting the
accommodation or acknowledgment of holidays with both
cultural and religious aspects.").
^'^

^^

^^

505 U.S.

577

(1992)

Id. at 627-628 (Souter, J., concurring) ("That
government must remain neutral in matters of religion does
not foreclose it from ever taking religion into account.
The State may "accommodate" the free exercise of religion
by relieving people from generally applicable rules that
interfere with their religious callings.
[Such]

.
.

.

.
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also emphasized that "accommodation must lift

a

discernible burden on the free exercise of religion,"
and concluded that government could release religious

believers from situations in which they needed to take
"^^
''sides between God and government
.

Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel

v.

Grumet^^ is the case

the Court struck down an accommodation law which gave

religious believers belonging to one sect the power to

operate

school district.

a

the majority,

Justice Souter, writing for

repeatedly discussed that government could

offer accommodation to religion if it secured religious

neutrality

^'^^
.

He concluded the case using his argument

for accommodation that "the statute

neutrality [since]

...

fails the test of

[i]t delegates a power

...

to an

electorate defined by common religious belief and
practice, in a manner that fails to foreclose religious

accommodation does not necessarily signify an official
endorsement of religious observance over disbelief."
(citation omitted)
)

^^

Id.

at 629

(Souter,

J.,

concurring)

^^

Id. at 628 (Souter, J., concurring);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)

see also
("[T]o
condition the availability of benefits upon this
appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of
her religious faith effectively penalizes the free
exercise of her constitutional liberties.").
^^

^°°

512 U.S.

687

(1994)

at 706-707

("[W]hatever the limits of
permissible legislative accommodations may be,
it is
clear that neutrality as among religions must be honored."
(citation omitted)
Id.

...

)

.
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favoritism.

^"^

Justice O'Connor also agreed in her

concurring opinion that neutrality is the main element to
evaluate permissible accommodation

.

Stating that the

'^^^

Religious Clauses require that one's legal status not be

influenced by one's religious belief,

^°"^

she emphasized:

What makes accommodation permissible
is not that the government is making life
easier for some particular religious group as
Rather, it is that the government is
such.
accommodating a deeply held belief.
Accommodations may thus justify treating
those who share this belief differently from
those who do not; but they do not justify
discriminations based on sect.''"^''
...

In his concurrence,

Justice Kennedy stressed that "when

the accommodation requires the government to draw

political or electoral boundaries,

Establishment Clause.

For him,

"'°^

it will violate the

the crucial limits for the

accommodation is that "government may not use religion as
a

criterion to draw political or electoral lines.

^°^

Id.

^°^

Id.

"^^^

at 709-710.

at 714 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("Religious needs can be
accommodated through laws that are neutral with regard to

religion

.

")

'''

Id.

'°'

Id.

"^°^

Id.

judgment)
'''

.

Id.

at 728

(Kennedy,

J.,

concurring in the

.

.
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C.

Analysis.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently

sustained the need for permissible accommodation.

It

appears clear that "the government has some latitude to

accommodate religion beyond the requirements of the Free
Exercise Clause," though the Court has not made persuasive
arguments on the limits of permissibility
outset,

"^^^

At the

.

it seems established law in the Court that

government may confer

a

benefit to religious believers as

well as secular persons based on religiously neutral

policies

"^°^
.

Probably, all the Justices in the Court would

agree with this sort of accommodation.

^°''

McConnell,

NowAK AND Ronald D.

supra note

Rotunda,

7,

"^°^

at 709;

The problem is

see also John E.
(5th ed.

Constitutional Law 12 8 8

Supreme Court has never explained the precise
limits that the establishment clause may place on the
ability of government to accommodate religion.")
1995)

("'The

^°^

See generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (property tax exemption); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (religious use in public university
facilities); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax
deduction for educational expenses); Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(financial vocational assistance for a blind student);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (grant program for
teenage sexuality counseling); Board of Educ of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(religious use in public high school facilities); Lamb's
Chapel V. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993) (religiously oriented use in public
school facilities); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, (1993) (providing interpreter for deaf
students); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va
115
S.Ct. 2510 (1995) (financial assistance for public
university student activities)
.

.

^°^

,

See e.g., Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2532 (Thomas,
concurring) ("[There is] one basic principle that has
enjoyed an uncharacteristic degree of consensus: The
J.,
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whether an accommodation that gives religious believers
some advantages over nonbelievers because of their

religion is permissible.

In other words,

can government

voluntarily offer religion special treatment in order to
implement the Free Exercise Clause?

With this aspect, all

the Justices but Justice Stevens^^° approve the right of

government to make accommodations that lift burdens on the
right of the free exercise of religion.
However,

there are some differences among Justices

with respect to the grounds and limits of the

accommodation.

I

should be emphasized that Justice

Brennan had underscored American history, traditions, and
heritage in order to determine whether
seems as

a

permissible accommodation.

a

government action

This view has been

taken over by Justice Kennedy, and perhaps Chief Justice

Clause does not compel the exclusion of religious groups
from government benefits programs that are generally
available to a broad class of participants.").
^^°

See e.g.. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct.
2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Whether the
Church would actually prevail under [Religious Freedom
Resolution Act of 1993] or not, the statute has provided
the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic
can obtain.
This governmental preference for religion
is forbidden by the First Amendment."); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("It is the overriding interest in keeping the
government - whether it be the legislature or the courts out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of
differing religious claims.
The risk that governmental
approval of some and disapproval of others will be
perceived as favoring one religion over another is an
important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to
preclude."); see also Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The
Status and Prospects of "Tests" under the Religion Clause,
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 323, 338 n.67.
2157,

...

.
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Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas.

'^^^

To

emphasize American history, traditions, and heritage in

justifying accommodation might be reasonable and,
cases,

persuasive.

They could be

However,

accommodations are needed.
could have

a

a

tendency to confer

a

in some

reason why such
those accommodations

benefit only on the

majority's religions or at least religions accepted by the
majority.

The government's discretion to determine

whether it alleviates its burdens on religion is the

underlying factor of permissible accommodations;
furthermore, the extension of accommodation benefits to

minor or unpopular and not-welcome religions would not be

expected by following American history, traditions, and
heritage.

Consequently, accommodation based on American

traditions may be utterly unfair to those religions
Moreover,

'"'"^
.

relying solely on the past could maintain

unwelcome traditions of American society, such as racial
and gender discriminations

.

''"'^

^^^

See Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2528 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[0]ur Nation's long tradition [allows]
religious adherents to participate on equal terms in
neutral government programs.").
^^^

See also Tushnet, supra note 90, at 387
on the historical record of community

C [R] slaying

acceptance of permissible accommodations [is] a distinctly
anticonstitutional stance, for constitutional limitations
are designed precisely because we cannot rely on
majorities to restrain themselves.").
'"'^

See County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)

.
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Other Justices also adopted the principle of

religious neutrality.

As one commentator indicates,

"[b]oth Justice Souter'

s

majority opinion and Justice

O'Connor's concurrence [in Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
suggested ways that the legislature could

Grumet]

V.

accomplish its desire to accommodate [religious adherents]
while the same time remaining faithful to the requirement
of the First Amendment

the requirement

'^^
.

"^'^

Neutrality toward religion is

.

Although

a

specific standard for

neutrality has not been articulated by the Court,

"^"^^

the

Court decided in Kiryas Joel that an accommodating law or

policy that confers

a

benefit on only one religion and

inclines not to give it to others fails the requirement of
the religious neutrality,

and thus,

it is

unconstitutional
It is true that the principle of neutrality gives us
a

more objective concept to justify accommodation than to

follow American history, traditions, and heritage.
However,

the rigid application of this principle may cause

serious problems to religious liberty.
the neutrality principle,

For example,

under

government would have to exempt

from the criminal code peyote consumption for religious
ritual to many suspect religious groups other than native

^'''

Basilios E. Tsingos, Forbidden Favoritism in the
Government Accommodation of Religion: Grumet and the Case
for Overturning Aguilar, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 8 67,
887

(1995)

.

"^^

Engstrom,

^^^

NowAK AND Rotunda,

supra note 35, at 133.
supra note 107, at 1218-1219.
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Americans.

Likewise,

from

it would have to exempt

compulsory education children other than the Amish.

In

other words, the principle could permit people to abuse
their rights in the name of religious liberty.

what the Constitution does not allow.

Thus,

This is

one cannot

agree with the assessment advanced by one commentator that

"Justice Souter'

s

opinion ultimately provided

...

more

guidance to government concerning the full range of steps
it could take to accommodate religion without violating

the Constitution.

"""^

Tsingos,

"-^^^

supra note 114, at 888.

CHAPTER III.

SCHOLARLY DEBATE.

Commentators hold widely disparate views on the
principle of accommodation.
sets of opinions.

Generally, there are three

The first block is that accommodation

should be allowed; government should be able to take

religion into account when it engages in policy-making
t^';

^^^
.

The second set of opinion holds that no accommodation is

acceptable, because secular policy of government must be

superior to religious needs.

^'^

The third view advocates a

certain kind of the accommodation; however, the decision
as to whether accommodation is needed belongs to the

judiciary, not to the legislature or executive branch.
In this chapter,

I

^^^

review these three sets of views,

focusing on the opinions of Professors Michael W.
McConnell, Laurence H. Tribe, Mark Tushnet,

Ira C. Lupu,

and Kent Greenawalt.

A.

Michael W. McConnell.
At the outset.

Professor McConnell assigns the

primary value and purpose of the Religion Clause to the

promotion of religious liberty,

'^^

and writes that "[t]he

118

See Infra text accompanying notes 121-149.

119

See infra text accompanying notes 150-170.

120

See infra text accompanying notes 171-181.

121

McConnell,

supra note
33

4,

at 1.

.

.

34

main components of religious liberty are the autonomy of
the religious institutions,
of religion,
any)

individual choice in matters

and the freedom to put

into practice

"'^^
.

a

chosen faith

(if

According to him, religious

liberty means "the freedom to choose whether to engage in
religious practice and which

(if any)

government coercion or interference

to adopt,

"'^^^
.

without

Professor

McConnell believes that the value of the free exercise of
religion should be preferred over the value of the

separation of religion and state in relation to the both
First Amendment clauses on religion

Based on his perception,

.

'^^'^

Professor McConnell

considers that permissible government accommodation
fosters religious liberty

.

'''^^

For him,

"an interpretation

of the Religious Clauses based on religious liberty"^^^

makes

a

clear line between permissible accommodations and

impermissible establishment, which is "an understanding of
the role of religion under the Constitution,

within

a

framework that acknowledges the legitimacy of encouraging

^22

Id.

^^^

Id.

at 37.

^^^

Id. at 1 (" [S] ometimes separation diminishes
religious liberty."); id. at 2 ("[The separation of church
and state is] subsidiary, instrumental, values in
religious liberty.")
...

^^^

Id.

^26

Id.

("[T]here exists a class of permissible
government action toward religion, which have as their
purpose and effect the facilitation of religious
liberty.")
at

3

.

35

and facilitating religious liberty.

"^^^

Professor

McConnell argues that accommodation is needed especially
when individual believers are faced to choose between

"religious duties and obligations" and "the demands of
society,

""^^^

which creating

circumstance,

a

a

serious conflict.

In this

religious accommodation purports to ease

those believers of the conflict between

a

religious belief

and the social order "without sacrificing significant

civic or social interests

.

"^^^

He explains the reason why

accommodation should not be restricted by the requirement
of the Free Exercise Clause that "the government is in a

better position than the courts to evaluate the strength
of its own interest in governing without religious

exceptions

""^"^^
.

As to this sort of accommodation,

a

court

can examine it only when otherwise "the constitutional

rights of other

persons"''"'^^

are seriously infringed.

Professor McConnell suggests that the crucial

distinction between permissible accommodation and

prohibited establishment is that the accommodation just
relieves religious believers from burdens on their free

exercise of religion, while the establishment is to induce

^^'

Id.

at 6.

^^^

Id.

at 26.

""^^

Id; see also id. at 35 ("The purpose of an
accommodation is to enable a person to practice his faith,
usually by removing social or governmental obstacle.")
'''

Id.

'''

Id.

at 31.
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or solicit to practice religions government favors.'^

this distinction,

Professor McConnell indicates

a

^

For

three-

prong scrutiny:
(1) A law or policy is unconstitutional
if its purpose or likely effect is to

increase religious uniformity either by
inhibiting the religious practice of the
person or group challenging the law (freeexercise clause) or by forcing or inducing a
contrary religious practice (establishment
clause); (2) a law or policy is
unconstitutional if its enforcement
interferes with the independence of a
religious body in matters of religious
significance to that body; (3) violation of
either of those principles will be permitted
only if it is the least restrictive means for
(a) protecting the private rights of others,
or (b) ensuring that the benefits and burdens
of public life are equitably shared
.

'^"^"^

Based on this understanding. Professor McConnell

criticizes the Lemon

test,^^''

which has been

a

single test

to scrutinize the Establishment Clause cases for the past

twenty years.

He argues that the Lemon test could not

^^^

McConnell, supra note 7, at 686 ("The key
difference between legitimate accommodation and
impermissible ^establishment' is that the former merely
removes obstacles to the exercise of a religious
conviction adopted for reasons independent of the
government's action, while the latter creates an incentive
or inducement ... to adopt that practice or conviction.").
^^^

Michael W. McConnell, Taking Religious Freedom
Seriously, in Religious Liberty in the Supreme Court 4 97, 506
(Terry Eastland ed., 1993).
"•^^

The Lemon test is a scrutiny that requires a law
or policy to have "a secular legislative purpose," not to
"advances nor inhibits religion," and not to "foster an

excessive government entanglement with religion."
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971)

V.

.

Lemon

.
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affirm any kind of accommodation, because the purpose and
effect of an accommodation are clearly to promote
religion, which is entirely opposite to the Lemon test.'^

Government,

in some cases,

^^necessarily advances religion

to accommodate the secular dictates of public policy to

the spiritual needs and concerns of religious

minorities

"^^^
.

Therefore,

it can be said that the

facilitation of religious liberty do not coexist with and
the Lemon test.'^^^

B.

Laurence

H.

Tribe.

Professor Tribe also recognizes the validity of
religious accommodation.''"^^ Like Professor McConnell,

Professor Tribe agrees with permissible government

^^^

McConnell, supra note 4, at 44 ("[U] under the
Lemon test, taken literally, no accommodation to religion
could ever be upheld.
The ^purpose' of an accommodation i
splainly to facilitate religion, and that will be its
'effect' as well.")
"^^

McConnell, supra note 133, at 502.
See also
Tithing in Chapter 13—A Divine Creditor Exception to
Section 13257, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1125, 1135-1136 (1997) ("A
literal application of Lemon would automatically render
any type of accommodation unconstitutional.")

Note,

.

McConnell, supra note 4, at 3 ("[T]he interest of
religious liberty and the rigors of the Lemon test are
most strikingly at cross-purposes.").
"^"^^

^^^

Tribe, supra note 17, § 14-4, at 1169 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he
concept [of accommodation] at least serves to highlight the way in
which the two religion clauses interact: cases within the area of
interaction are difficult precisely because different results are
arguably mandated by the two religion clauses."); see also id. § 14essential to reconciling the
14, at 1276 ("[Accommodation] is
establishment clause with the free exercise clause and with other
freedom." (footnote omitted)).
...

.
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accommodation,

^"^^

and also argues that the free exercise of

religion prevails over the separation of religion and
state when both the Free Exercise Clause and the

Establishment Clause run afoul of each other.
realizes,

too,

^''°

He

that although there are some risks in

emasculating the Establishment Clause when government has
the unlimited authority to accommodate religion,

government act is more efficient than are the courts in
rendering accommodation
In so doing.

.

''^''

Professor Tribe suggests three factors

which make clear limits of permissible accommodation

"^^^
.

The first factor is whether an accommodation is given to

particular sect of religion or religion at large.

'^^'^

a

If it

passes "an evenhandedness requirement,"^'''' the

accommodation is valid.

The second element is that if the

139

Id. § 14-4, at 1168 n.ll ("Legislature as well as courts
may be free to make such accommodations." (citation omitted)).
^^°

Id. § 14-8, at 1201 ("[There is] the conclusion
that the free exercise principle should be dominant when
it conflicts with the anti-establishment principle.
Such
dominance is the natural result of tolerating religion as
broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs
even the faintest appearance of establishment.")
^^^

Id. § 14-7, at 1195 ("Leaving room for
legislatures to craft religious accommodations recognizes
that they may be in a better position than courts to
decide [whether they should offer the accommodations].
But unbounded tolerance of governmental accommodation in
the name of free exercise neutrality could eviscerate the
establishment clause." (footnote omitted)).
^^^

"^
'''

Id.
Id.
Id.

§

14-7,

at 1198.

.

.

.
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accommodation decreases "regulatory entanglement between
church and state,

"^''^

it is seen as legitimate.

The third

factor is whether the accommodation lifts government-

imposed burden on religion

^''^

If the accommodation aims

.

to reduce "privately imposed"^''^ burden,

it can not be seen

as permissible.

Professor Tribe focuses here on costs that are raised
from the exemption of government burden on religion.

He

understands that some unrelated and innocent people have
to answer those costs.

Even so, however, there is an

underlying boundary that government should not ask the
public to accept in the name of religious accommodation,
such as allowing murder,

stealing, and fraud.

for the price of accommodation.

'^''^

Finally,

Professor Tribe implies

that government could offer alternatives to those who seek

religious exemption, which do not burden their religion

'''^
.

^^^

Id.
Although Professor Tribe does not mention,
this factor may validate the property tax exemption upheld
in Walz V. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
^''

Id.

^""^

Id.

§

14-1

,

at 1199

(footnote omitted)

.

^^^

Id. § 14-13, at 1258 ("Certain widely recognized
harms - such as physical injury - can be prevented even at
the cost of infringing religious freedom.")
^"^

Id. § 14-13, at 1266 ("The use of conscientious
objectors in paramedical or other non-military role could
meet both the personal argument and the morale argument."
(footnote omitted)
)

.
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C.

Mark Tushnet
In following Professor Philip Kurland'

neutrality theory,

^^°

s

strict

Professor Tushnet stands in

a

position that refuses any kind of accommodation to
religion

.

He insists that accommodation is against the

'^^^

Establishment Clause,

because it is, in fact, government

'^^''

endorsement of religion

'"^'^
.

Professor Tushnet shows his skepticism by arguing
that accommodation or exemption from generally applicable
laws may well be administered "in

discriminatory manner

"'^^'^
.

a

troublingly

Government tends to preserve

major religions "by enacting exemptions under the doctrine
of permissible accommodation of religion or by avoiding

enactments that have

a

troublesome impact

on"'^^^

those

"[Rjeligions on the close-in borders of the

religions.

It is to summarize Kurland' s theory that government cannot
take religion into account when it makes policies, see Philip
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1

(1961)

.

Tushnet, supra note 90, at 376-377, 384 (saying that,
according to Professor Kurland, both required and permissible
accommodations are not acceptable under the Religious Clause.).
^^^

Id.

at 384.

153

Id. at 390 ("[A]n exemption confined to religion must
signal government endorsement of religion as such.").
154

BYU L. Rev.

^"

Mark Tushnet,
117,
Id.

134.

The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse,

1993
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mainstream""^^^ can easily get a protection from courts.

However, odd religions are outside of their protection

^^^
.

Professor Tushnet raises the difficulties created by
the Court's criteria that limit the boundary of

permissible accommodation.

As to Justice Kennedy's

noncoercive test,^^^ he criticizes it in two points.
First,

this test may "deprive the Establishment Clause of

meaning independent of the Free Exercise Clause, which
standing alone would seem to ban government coercion of
religious belief or observance

.

"^^^

Secondly,

Justice

Kennedy's dependence to American history, traditions, and
and reference to communities'''^^ as justifications

heritage,

of accommodation,

community

...

allows "a majority of the citizens of

[to do]

what they want to

do."'^^'^

It may have

some tendency to accommodate only religions that they

prefer,

and to discriminate against those eccentric
1

religions.

fro

Professor Tushnet writes that this is

exactly what the Establishment Clause prohibits

'''

.

''^^

Id.

157

Id ("[N] either the courts nor the legislature protect
exotic religions.").

[Sj

ICQ

See supra text accompanying note 93.
159

Tushnet,

supra note 90,

at 386.

See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Tushnet,

supra note 90,

a

at 386.

Id ("[T]hey are simply reflecting their own religious
preference on matters of specifically religious concern.").
^^^
Id. at 386-387 ("'[T]his kind of government affiliation
with particular religious messages is precisely what the

s
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Professor Tushnet divides Justice Brennan'

standard

s

for permissible accommodation^^'^ in to two parts:

"Accommodations of religion are permissible if they
^remove burdens on the free exercise of religion,
can be imposed by governments

and

...,

{b)

'

(a)

which

are sufficiently

broad [enough to other non-religious activities]

."'''

^

Although Professor Tushnet concedes that Justice Brennan'
standard

"...

is undeniably attractive,

are "some doctrinal dif f iculties

"'"'^^

"^^"^

he finds there

According to

.

Professor Tushnet, the standard may not accord with

accommodation provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act
of 1964,"^^^ since this provision alleviates employees from

burdens imposed by their employer,

government

^^^

and not by

'^'^^
.

Establishment Clause precludes.'" (quoting County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 601 n.51 (1989))),
164

See supra text accompanying with note 85.
Id.

at 391 (quoting County of Allegheny v. American Civil
492 U.S. 573, 601 n.51 (1989))).

Liberties Union,

Tushnet,
'''

^^^

supra note 90,

at 391.

Id.

42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e(j)

(1988

&

Supp.

IV 1992));

see also supra note 74.
^^^

Tushnet, supra note 90, at 392 ("A statutory
requirement of reasonable accommodation would
relieve
that burden, though surely the burden Congress really had
in mind was the one placed on the employee by an
employer's failure to accommodate.").
...

^^°

Id. at 393 n.69 ("It may be
that the
^reasonable accommodation' requirement is inconsistent
...

.
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D.

Ira C.

Lupu.

Defining that required accommodations concern free

exercise issues and permissive accommodations always
bring about Establishment Clause cases,

^^''

Professor Lupu

asserts that there are "important institutional

differences

between mandatory and permissive

...

accommodations."^''^

The authority to offer required

accommodation belongs to courts, and on the other hand,
the other branches of government may confer permissible

accommodation

"^^^
.

Professor Lupu suggests that it is unavoidable to
confront permissible accommodation with the Establishment

Clause "because of the extent to which it unleashes

politics in the service of religion

""^^^
.

He indicates

difficulties inherent in the accommodation that

a

policy

of permissible accommodation usually contains "religionspecific"'^^^ factors.

with Justice Brennan'
accommodation.")
171

Thus,

s

the accommodating policy tends

theory of permissible

Lupu, supra note 18, at 751 ("Claims to mandatory
accommodations always present free exercise questions, because their
underlying theory is that the Free Exercise Clause is violated if the
accommodation is not provided.
Claims to permissive accommodations
always raise Establishment Clause questions, because their underlying
theory is that government is free to respond beneficially to
religion-specific concerns.").
172

'''

Id.

at 753.

Id.

^''^

Id.

at 754.

^^^

Id.

at 768.

.
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to favor religion over non-religion.'^''^

In saying so,

Professor Lupu states that permissible accommodation is

unconstitutional

'''''

He shows several dangers in

.

permissible accommodation.
"be overbroad,

[because]

First,

the accommodation could

it will encompass relief for both

those who are entitled to it and those who are not."^^®
Second,

it may cause religious favoritism.

'^^^

The third

danger is that it is likely "to discriminate against nonreligious association

""^^°
.

Instead,

Professor Lupu

believes that required accommodation is the only way to
lift burdens form religion, which is regulated by the

judicial branch

E.

'^''
.

Kent Greenawalt.

Professor Greenawalt agrees with that the words of

Religious Clauses and those histories justify
kind of religious accommodation

"'^^
.

a

certain

He thinks that it is

"^''^

Id ("Such policies always prefer religion to
their non-religious counterparts." (footnote omitted)).
'''^

Id.

at 771

(" [P]

ermissive accommodations should

be eliminated.").
^^^

Id.

at 776 n.l66

^^^

Id.

at 776-778.

^^°

Id.

at 778.

(citation omitted).

'^^^

Id. at 780 ("Courts would have maximum authority
to police the boundaries of state-religion interaction.")
But see Employment Div., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (The Court denied a religious claim seeking
accommodation in the courts)
"^^^

Greenawalt,

supra note 110, at 340.

.
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not an endorsement of religion to accommodate whose

belief and practices are likely to clash with the social
order.

^^^

Like as Professor McConnell

^^"^

Professor

,

Greenawalt conceives that an accommodation or exemption
that induces nonbelievers to convert to

a

religion is

unconstitutional."^^^

Professor Greenawalt also suggests the possibility of

imposing alternative burdens on religious believers for
the price of benefited accommodations.
him,

According to

the alternative burdens could reduce the concern of

not favoring religion over non-religion caused by

conferring accommodations solely to religion

.

'^^'^

The

alternative burdens also prevent false accommodation
claims of which government needs to remove from

accommodation policies.

Therefore, "few would choose

^^^

Id.

^^^

See supra text accompanying note 132.

[the

at 340-341

"^^

Greenawalt, supra note 110, at 358 {"[I]t need
not grant an exemption that would strongly induce others
to practice a religion, since such inducements violate the
Establishment Clause." (footnote omitted)).
^^^

at 357 n.l32 ("One important avenue of
investigation is whether some alternative burden, like
alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors,
may be placed upon religious claimants, so that overall
Id.

burdens are not too disproportionate."
omitted)

(citation

)

^^^

Id ("Exemptions for religious claimants alone do
raise serious equal protection concern.
These can be
mitigated by alternative burdens." (citation omitted)).
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accommodation] unless they were deeply opposed

generally applicable

to"'^^^

laws,'^^^

Unlike Professor McConnell,

Professor Greenawalt

asserts that permissible accommodation corresponds with
the Lemon test,

"has

though he repeatedly states that the test

been abandoned

...

"^^^

Despite having

.

a

non-secular

purpose and an effect advancing religion, such

accommodations are "understood as secular or acceptable
religious accommodation

"^^^
.

Court can simply say that

a

Under the Lemon test,

"the

law that works an appropriate

accommodation is permissible, without having to ^explain'
either that accommodation is not

a

purpose and primary

effect that advances religion or that some purposes and

primary effects that advance religion are really all
right.

"^^^

Professor Greenawalt insists that the Establishment
Clause should articulate the clear limitation of any sort
of accommodations

'°°

'"^^
.

He characterizes that "[t]he

Id.

""^^

See also Jesse Choper, The Rise and Decline of
the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70
Neb. L. Rev. 651, 680 (1991)
("This would minimize any
incentive to file fraudulent claims, and reduce the
likelihood that government exemption would induce people
to adopt certain beliefs, thus avoiding establishment
clause problems." (footnote omitted)).
190

Greenawalt,

191

Id.

192

193

supra note 110, at 361-362.

at 367.

Id.

Id. at 381 ("Whether an accommodation is claimed
to be constitutionally required or is chosen by a

.

.
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distinction between lifting burdens and promoting religion
is partly one of conceptual dif f erentiation

"'^^^
.

he leaves this question for further analysis

However,

^^^
.

legislature, the Establishment Clause restricts what is
constitutionally permissible.")
^^'

Id.

at 386.

easy categorization of
impermissible promotion versus permissible compensation
resolves this problem; a deeper analysis is required."
(footnote omitted)
"""^^

Id.

at 387

)

("[No]

.

.

CHAPTER IV.

LAW OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN GERMANY AND

JAPAN

In this chapter,

I

want to make reference to statutes

and cases in both Germany and Japan that address religious

accommodation.

Although the relationship of the German

government to religion is quite different from that of in
the United States,

"^^^

and religious atmosphere in Japan is

also different from that in America,

"^^^

it is sufficiently

useful to know how these two countries adopt statutory

accommodations or decide judicial accommodations.
Furthermore, it appears that both countries make good

examples with respect to "alternative burden" on religious

believers as the price of the accommodation.''"^^

"^^^

Germany has adopted "a concordant system which
clearly separates the area managed by religious
organization from area managed by the government." Yokota,
supra note 1, at 205.
See also Kommers, supra note 2, at
444 ("The multiplicity of the Basic Law's provisions on
church-state relations contrasts sharply with the simple
command of the U.S. Constitution.")
"^^

See Yokota, supra note 1, at 206 ("The religious
consciousness of Japanese people is different from that of
Americans
Most Japanese do not have a single faith,
such as Christianity
[T]he attitude [of Japanese
people] toward religion is best demonstrated by the fact
that most Japanese take a newly born baby to [a] Shinto
shrine, visit a Shinto shrine to celebrate the New Year,
have a Christian or Shinto wedding, and are buried in a
Buddhist funeral." (citation omitted)).
....

...

....

"^^

See supra text accompanying notes 149,
48

186-189.

.

.
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A.

Germany.
As to religious liberty,

which is,

Article

the Basic Law

(Grundgesetz)

,

the German constitution, provides in

in effect,

4:

Freedom of faith, of conscience, and
freedom of creed, religious or ideological
(weltanschaulich)
shall be inviolable.
The undisturbed practice of religion is
(2)
guaranteed
No one may be compelled against his
(3)
conscience to render war service involving
Details shall be regulated
the use of arms.
by a federal law.'''^^
(1)

,

Discrimination based on religion,
of religious conviction,

practice religion,

^°^

^^'^

^°°

involuntary disclosure

and coercion to participate or

are also banned by other provisions.

Autonomy for religious groups is also protected by Basic
Law.^°^

In contrast with other constitutional liberties,

religious liberty is not restrained by the reservation
clause of the Basic

""^^

2,

§4 GG
at 444.
^°°

^°^

§§
§

3

(Germany)

(3)

136

incorporated by
2°2

Id.

^°^

§

137

incorporated by
^°'^

Law.^°''

,

(2)

§

(2)

§

33

,

(3)

translated in

Kommers,

supra note

GG.

Weimar Constitution of 1919,
14

GG.

Weimar Constitution of 1919,
14

GG

supra note 2, at 444.
The reservation clause prescribes:
(1)

Kommers,

Insofar as under this Basic Law a basic
right may be restricted by or pursuant to a
law, the law must apply generally and not

s

.

s
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On the relationship between religion and the state,

German practice differs greatly from the American
approach. ^°^
religion,

^°^

Although Basic Law prohibits having

a

state

and government is required to be neutral

toward religion,

^^"^

in public schools,

the Law allows religious instructions
^°^

and gives corporate religious

Furthermore
solely to an individual case.
the law must name the basic right,
indicating the Article.
In no case may a basic right be infringed
(2)
upon in its essential content.
The basic rights apply also to
(3)
corporations established under German Public
law to the extent that the nature of such
rights permits.
Should any person's right be violated by
(4)
public authority, recourse to the court
shall be open to him.
If no other court has
jurisdiction, recourse shall be to the
ordinary courts.
§ 19 GG, translated in General Electric' s Germany & Europe
Round Table, BASIC LAW for the Federal Republic of Germany
(17 Aug. 1993)
<gopher //wiretap spies .com: 7 0/00/Gov/World/germany con>
.

:

.

^°^

KOMMERS, supra note 2, at 445 ("The meaning of
nonestablishment in Germany differs significantly from its
meaning in the United States." (footnote omitted)).
^°^

§ 137 (1) Weimar Constitution of 1919,
incorporated by § 140 GG, translated in General Electric'
Germany & Europe Round Table, supra note 204.
^°^

supra note 2, at 445.
religious neutrality means
nonintervention, nonidentif ication, equality, and
cooperation with religion by government, see id. at 472.
KoMMERS,

In Germany,

^°^

translated in General Electric'
Germany & Europe Round Table, supra note 204.
It provides:
§ 7

(3)

GG,

Religious instruction forms part of the
ordinary curriculum in state and municipal

s

.
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organizations power to impose taxes,

constitutional law recognizes

a

^°^

As the German

significant character of

religion "in the nation's public life,"^^° it permits
religion to get into public places, such as military
bases, hospital, and prisons,

for religious practice.

^^^

When one's religious liberty conflicts with social
order regulated by generally applicable laws,

it is the

court's task balance of "the interests of both the

schools, excepting secular schools.
Without
prejudice to the state's right of
supervision, religious instruction is given
in accordance with the tenets of the
religious communities.
No teacher may be
obliged against his will to give religious
instruction
^°^

§ 137 (2) Weimar Constitution of 1919,
incorporated by § 140 GG, translated in General Electric'
Germany & Europe Round Table, supra note 204.
It provides:

Religious bodies forming corporations
with public rights are entitled to levy taxes
on the basis of the civil tax rolls, in
accordance with the provisions of Land law.
^•'"°

KoMMERS,

supra note

2,

at 445.

^^^

§ 141 Weimar Constitution of 1919, incorporated
by § 140 GG, translated in General Electric' s Germany &
Europe Round Table, supra note 204.
It provides:

Religious bodies shall have the right of
entry for religious purposes into the army,
hospitals, prisons, or other public
institutions, so far as is necessary for the
arrangement of public worship or the exercise
of pastoral offices, but every form of
compulsion must be avoided.

52

individual and society.

[religious]

"^^'

Religious liberty

can be always supported as long as it does not harm "the

good order of the community

"^^^
.

As to permissible accommodation,

provides

a

the Basic Law

conscientious objector provision.

''

In 1956,

when German government started compulsory military
service,

^^^

it exempted the service from conscientious

objectors because of the constitutional provision.
However, the government imposed an alternative burden on

conscientious objectors,
In 1968,

(1971),

Id;
98.

supra note
^"^

such as to work at hospitals.

this alternative burden for civilian service"'^' as

supra note

KoMMERS,
^"^

^'^

§

2,
4

2,

at

4

51.

see also Blood Transfusion case, BVerGE 32
For English summary of this case, see Kommers,
at 451-455.
(3)

GG;

see supra text accompanying notes

199.
^"^

Kommers,

'''

Id.

^^"^

§ 12a

supra note

2,

at

4

62.

incorporated by § 140 GG,
translated in General Electric' s Germany & Europe Round
Table, supra note 204.
It provides:
(2)

GG,

A person who refuses, on grounds of
conscience, to render war service involving
the sue of arms may be required to render a
substitute service.
The duration of such
substitute service shall not exceed the
duration of military service.
Details shall
be regulated by a statute which shall not
interfere with freedom to take a decision
based on conscience and shall also provide
for the possibility of a substitute service
not connected with units of the Armed Forces
or of the Federal Border Guard.

.
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well as the military service^'^^ was written into the Basic
Law.^^^

German Constitutional Court considered the

alternative burden as security for the neutrality to
religion over non-religion

Article 12

(2)

^^°
.

of Basic Law states "[t]he duration of

such substitute service shall not exceed the duration of

military service

"^^^
.

Therefore, the period of

"substitutive service" had been regarded as the same term
as that of military service.

enacted

In 1983,

the government

law "which extended the period of compulsory

a

civilian service to twenty months, five months longer than
the fifteen months required of military conscripts

.

"^^^

It

supposed that only good faith objectors would agree to
spend substituting service for

^^^

a

period

a

third more than

12a (1) GG, incorporated by § 140 GG,
translated in General Electric' s Germany & Europe Round
Table, supra note 204.
§

It provides:

Men who have attained the age of 18
years may be required to serve in the Armed
Forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a
civil defense organization.
^^^

KOMMERS,

supra note

2,

at

4

62-4 63.

^^°

See Objector Notification case, BVerGE 48 (1978),
For English summary of this case, see Kommers, supra
note 2, at 464
127.

^^^

^^^

See supra note 217.

Kommers, supra note 2, at 4 65.
In addition to fifteen months of military duty, they
need to spend nine months of reserve duty, in which they
"may be called up for" national crisis. Id.
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the usual term of military service.

^^^

However, because

this enactment literally contradicted the words of Article
12a

the Constitutional Court reviewed the

(2),

constitutionality of the
upheld the act,

ooc

The Constitutional Court

law.^^''

saying that it was substantially equal

between military service and substituting service, even
though conscientious objectors had to go through the duty
five months longer.

authority "to

...

Moreover,

it permitted the government

lay down durational requirements that seek

to balance the burden of military and nonmilitary

service,

"^^^

unless the total period for substituting

service was less than "twenty-four months

basic training and nine on reserve duty)

B.

."

(fifteen in
^^"^

Japan.

Japanese Constitutional Law provides provisions with
respect to both the free exercise of religion and

separation of religion and state.
(1)

Article 20 states:

Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all.
No religious organization shall receive any
privileges from the State, nor exercise any
political authority.

'''

Id.

'''

Id.

^^^

Extended Alternative Service case, BVerGE 69
For English summary of this case, see Kommers,
supra note 2, at 4 65.
(1985),

1.

^^^

Kommers,

22^

Id.

supra note

2,

at

4

65.

.
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2)

No person shall be compelled to take part
in any religious acts, celebration, rite or

practice
The State and its organs shall refrain
3)
from religious education or any other
religious activity. ^^^
Moreover, Article 89 prohibits government from conferring

financial aid on religious organizations
As a matter of fact,

.^^^

the issue of religious

accommodation had not been seen as an important judicial
matter,

since the Japanese people are not observant

generally and easily accept government' policies that
accommodate religion. ^^°

Furthermore, the Japanese

sometimes compromise their religious belief to comply with
For those reasons,

in the social order.

it was hardly

likely for religious accommodation to become an issue in
the courts. ^^'^

^^^

Kenpo (Japan), art. 20, para. 3, translated in
Japanese Constitutional Law 321 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki

Takahashi eds
^^^

.

Kenpo,

,

1993)

art.

.

89.

It proscribes:

No public money or other property shall
be expended or appropriated for the use,
benefit or maintenance of any religious
institution or association ....
translated in Japanese Constitutional Law, supra note
228, at 327-328.
^''°

See supra note 197.

^^'^

Until the Japanese Supreme Court held Matsumoto
Kobayashi (Kobe City College of Technology Case)
906
Hanrei Taimuzu 77 (Sup. Ct
Mar. 8, 1996), there were only
two cases in lower courts that dealt with religious
accommodation, see Ito Masami, Kenpo 270 (3d ed. 1995)
V.

,

.

,

.
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There is other feature in Japanese establishment
cases,

that is,

a

In the early

historical factor.

twentieth century, the then largely military government
ruling Japan, adopted Shinto^^^ as an ideology to unify and

control the people in the name of Ten'no, the Japanese

Emperor [Kokka Shinto)

.

Since many Japanese people

suffered from the government policy unifying their minds
into one, the establishment cases tend to reflect people's
fear against the connection between Shinto and the

government

.^^^

In 1996,

the Japanese Supreme Court for the first

time decided an accommodation case in Matsumoto

v.

Kobayashi (Kobe City College of Technology Case).^^^
Before discussing this case, it is necessary to examine
the establishment case law in Japan.

^^^

Shinto is Japanese native religion, which
worships one's ancestors, a historical person, a certain
tree, stone, mirror, and sword, etc.
I want to emphasize that believing in Shinto does not
necessarily connect with worship to Japanese Emperor.
Some Shinto shrine, such as Izumo Taisha, in Shimane
Prefecture, was established by the Emperor at that time to
comfort the spirit of his enemy.
In this sense, the
description of one commentator is wrong, Eric N. Weeks, A
Widow's Might: Nakaya v. Japan and Japan's Current State
of Religious Freedom, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 691, 693-695.
I am
disappointed that some of Japanese historical and cultural
features are still misunderstood among American people in
the light of exoticism.
^"^"^

"^

See infra cases accompanying notes 235-256.
906 Hanrei Taimuzu 77

(Sup.

Ct

.

,

Mar.

8,

1996).
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(1)

The establishment clause test:

Tsu City case and The

Serviceman Enshrinement case.
The Supreme Court of Japan has considered that the

relationship between religion and the state can not be

a

The leading case for this view is Kakunaga

rigid one.

Sekiguchi (Tsu City

This case involved whether

case).'^'^^

Tsu City, Mie Prefecture,

which held

groundbreaking ceremony

ichinsai)

{j

v.

a

religious

and paid 7,663 yen as

the cost of the ceremony when it began to construct its

gymnasium,

^^^

violated the establishment clause of the

Japanese Constitution

.

^^^

The district court concluded

that the city did not violate the clause "on the ground
that the ceremony was secular and customary," and "the

expenditures were not for the purpose of assisting any

particular religious organization

The high court

(the

reversed the district court's ruling,

court of appeal)
saying,

"^"^^
.

"[s]ince the Constitution provides the strict

separation of religion and state, the ceremony falls into
the religious activity which is prohibited by Article 20,

paragraph 3."^^^

^^^

The Supreme Court finally upheld the

31 MiNSHU 533

(Sup.

Ct

.

,

Jul.

13,

1977).

^"^^

Id. 536-537, translated in Lawrence W. Beer and
HiROSHi ITOH, The Constitutional Case Law of Japan, 197
through

1990,

478

(1996)

.

The religious ceremony was held in the way of Shinto.
^^''

See Kenpo, art. 20, para.

^^^

ITOH,

3.

Kakunaga, 31 Minshu at 537,
supra note 236, at 479.

"^

Id.

translated in Beer

and

:
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ceremony, explaining that it was not the activity the

Constitution proscribed.
In so deciding,

the Supreme Court described its

standpoint for the interpretation of the establishment
clause
The principle of separation of religion
[s]tate has been understood [as the
secularism and religious neutrality of the
government which] mean that [issues] of
religion and belief have been considered
matters of individual conscience that
transcend the dimension of politics and are
which, as the
separated from [government]
holder of secular authority, is not to
interfere with religion .'^''°

and

...

,

The Constitution [must] be interpreted
as striving for a secular and religiously
neutral [government] by talcing as its ideal
the total separation of religion and
[s]tate.2^^
...

The separation of religion and
[s]tate, however, is only [an institutional]
guarantee of religious freedom.
It does not
directly guarantee freedom of religion pre
se, it attempts to guarantee it indirectly by
securing a system that separates religion and
...

...

[s]tate.^^^

It is inevitable to say that there is a
certain inherent limit in the separation of

religion and state. When the principle of
the separation of religion and state would be
embodied as an actual national institution.
^''°

236,

translated in Beer

and Itoh,

supra note

translated in Beer
(emphasis added

and Itoh,

supra note

at 538,

at 479
^^"^

236,

Id.

Id.

at 480
^^^

Id.

at 539,

at 539-540, translated
tr
in Beer and Itoh,
(first emphasis added

note 236, at 480

supra

,
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the issue is that in what case and to what
extent the relationship would not be
permitted,
premising that a certain
relationship between religion and state is in
fact inevitable, in the light of its own
social and cultural characteristics.^''^
...

The principle does not prohibit all the
relationship between religion and state,
while it requires the religious neutrality of
It prohibits the
the government.
relationship which would be seen as to exceed
reasonable boundary in the light of those
[social and cultural] characteristics, taking
into consideration the purpose and effect of
the government activities which entail the
relationship.^^''

Religious activity which Article 3,
paragraph 3 prescribes should be defined
as
the activity whose purpose has religious
meaning and whose effect supports, promotes,
and fosters, or oppresses and interferes with
religion .^''^
...

In determining whether a certain
activity consists with a religious activity,
it is not enough to focus only the fact in
appearance, such as whether the master of the
activity is a clergy, or whether the content
of it belongs religion.
Rather, the issue
must be decided objectively, based on a
common sense of the society {syakai tsuunen)
taking into account all the circumstances,
such as the place the activity was held,
people's evaluation on the activity, the
purpose, intent, and religious recognition of
the government which held the activity, and
the effect and influence of the activity with
people .^^^

243

Id.

at 540-541.

244

Id.

at 541.

245

Id.

^"^

Id.

at 541-542
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The standard that the Supreme Court announced in this
case was that the prohibited religious activity is "the

activity whose purpose has religious meaning and whose
effect supports, promotes, and fosters, or oppresses and

interferes with religion

"^''^

It has become the standard

.

for the establishment cases.

The Supreme Court of Japan affirmed this purpose-and-

effect test

Serviceman Enshrinement Case).^^^
appellee,

a

in Japan v.

{mokuteki kouka kijun)

In this case,

(The

the

Japanese Christian whose husband "was killed

in a traffic accident while on his duty,

against the Self Defense Force
military,

Nakaya

(SDF)

,

"^''^

brought

a

suit

the Japanese

for which her husband worked.

The appellee

asked for the damages because of the injury of her right
to live in a religiously peaceful atmosphere caused by an

application made by others to the Gokoku Shrine^^° for his
enshrinement, which "is the conferring

of the status of

^^''

See supra text accompanying note 245.

^^^

42 MiNSHU 277

(Sup.

Ct

.

Some American commentators
e.g.. Stone et al., supra note 5,
232; Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again:
Administrative Massacre, 144 U.
(1995)

Jun

,

.

1,

1988).

addressed this case, see
at 1570; Weeks, supra note
Legal Rememhe ranee of
Pa.

L.

Rev.

463,

607

.

^''^

ITOH,

...

Nakaya, 42 Minshu at 279,
supra note 236, at 496.

^^°

translated In Beer

and

Gokoku Shrine is a regional branch of Yasukunl
Shrine, which used to be a symbolic place for Kokka
Shinto.
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[a]

god upon

a

mortal person,

"^^^

This sort of

enshrinement happens occasionally in Shinto religion.
also alleged that both

a

regional office of the SDF and

association arranged the application.

its veterans'

She

The

district court and the high court gave her damages finding
that the application had been made by the SDF and the

association and that her right had been infringed.
However, the Supreme Court reversed, partly because there
was no state action in this case,^^^ and partly because

"[t]he interest of living one's religious life in a

peaceful religious atmosphere,

[which the appellee

^^^

WiNNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA:
Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United States 103,

n.80

(1994)

.

^"

Nakaya, 42 Minshu at 283 ("The actions actually
taken by the [SDF] staff were only the following: [a SDF
staff] asked [other regional offices of the SDF] about the
status of joint enshrinement of dead SDF members in their
area, and shared their answers with [the association; an
other staff did a favor for the association to draft a
guidance for the enshrinement {Hosei Junsoku)
and letters
from [the association] asking for donation, [to distribute
those letters, to keep] custody of donated funds, [to
collect] the certified copies [necessary for the
enshrinement]
No facts show that [the regional office]
or its staff directly approached Gokoku Shrine for the
joint enshirnement
[Therefore,] although it is true that
[the regional office] cooperated with [the association] by
performing clerical work, the application under the name
of [the association] was [the independent action held by
the association substantively.
Thus, it] cannot be
regarded as a joint action of [the regional office] staff
and [the association, and as the application the staff
also made]."
{translated in Beer and Itoh, supra note 236,
]

.

.

at 499)

)

.
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asserted, was] of such

a

nature that it cannot be

recognized [necessarily] as

a

legal right.

"^^"^

In evaluating whether the SDF engaged in the

religious activity, the Supreme Court adopted the same
analysis described in the Tsu City case:

Religious activity under [Article 20,
paragraph 3 of the Constitution] should not
be construed to include any acts related to
religion, but to mean only those acts whose
purpose has religious meaning and whose
effect is to [support, promote, and foster,
or oppresses and interferes] with religion.
When we examine whether a certain action
constitutes religious activity, we should
decide objectively, [based on common sense of
the society, taking into account all the
circumstances, such as the place the activity
was held, people's evaluation on the
activity, the purpose, intent, and religious
recognition of the government which held the
activity, the effect and influence of the
activity on people]. ^^"^
[J]oint enshrinement [is] conducted
by the independent decisions of [Gokoku
Shrine]
so an application is not a
prerequisite.
[Though] it related to
religion, the application in this case
[should] not be regarded as a legal
prerequisite for enshrinement.
The actual
actions of the [SDF] staff in cooperation
with [the association had] an indirect
relationship with religion and their purpose
and intention were assumed to be to raise the
social status and morale of SDF members.
Hence, they had little religious
consciousness, [and we cannot conclude that
people would observe the manners of their
;

^^^

236,

Id.

at 288,

translated in Beer

and Itoh,

supra note

at 501.
^^^

Id. at 285 (citing Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City
31 Minshu 533, 541-542 (Sup. Ct
Jul. 13, 1977)),
translated in Beer and Itoh, supra note 236, at 499-500.

case),

.

,
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actions as those which has the effect as a
government activity to attract attention to a
particular religion, or to support, promote,
and foster, or oppresses and interferes with
religion]
Thus, though they had a
relationship to religion, the acts of the
[SDF] staff cannot be considered religious
activity.^"
.

Article 20, paragraph 3 of the
Constitution provides for separation of
religion and
[s]tate; it is known as
providing a systemic guarantee, and does not
guarantee religious freedom itself directly
Rather, it attempts
to individual persons.
indirectly to assure freedom of religion by
setting forth [limits] of the acts in which
the [government] may not engage and
guaranteeing the separation as a system.
Therefore, religious acts of the [government]
which violate this provision should not
necessarily be considered unlawful in
relation to individual persons unless they
directly infringe upon their religious
freedom as guaranteed by the Constitution .^^^
...

It might seem that the purpose-and-ef f ect test is

similar to the Lemon test,^^^ which was used by the U.S.
Supreme Court. ^^^

There are, however, several differences

between the two tests.

255

236,

Id.

at 286,

At first,

the test in Japan did

translated in Beer

and Itoh,

supra note

at 500.

"^

Id. at 286-287 (citing Kakunaga (Tsu City case),
31 MiNSHU at 539-540) , translated in Beer and Itoh, supra
note 236, at 500.
^^^

As to the Lemon test,

^^^

See Yokota,

supra note

see supra note 134.
1,

at 216.

64

not adopt the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.^^^

Second,

government activity could be invalid under the

a

Lemon test
Dist.

articulated in School

(or even under the test

of Abington

v.

Schempp^^^)

if it has either purpose

or effect to promote or inhibit religion.

By contrast,

the activity would not be invalid under the Japanese test

even if it has both purpose and effect to promote religion

unless it "exceed

[s]

reasonable boundary in the light of

social and cultural characteristics

.

"^^^

In this sense,

the Japanese test seems to be less strict than the Lemon

Finally,

test.

the Japanese test takes into account

"common sense of the society.

"^^^

This means that if the

majority of the society does not, in fact, perceive the
activity as

a

religious,

the activity may be considered to

^^^

See id ("The Japanese Supreme Court standard
differs from the American three-prong test in [the
excessive entanglement prong].").
One commentator believes that the "purpose-andeffect" test also requires government not to entangle in
religion. Weeks, supra note 232, at 713, but it is wrong.
^^°

^^^

374 U.S.

203

Kakunaga

v.

(1963)

.

Sekiguchi (Tsu City case)

,

31 Minshu

540 (Sup. Ct., Jul. 13, 1977).
One commentator analyzes the "purpose-and-ef f ect"
test in the same way as to do for the Lemon test. Weeks,
supra note 235, at 709-713.
I think that his analysis and
the comparison do not make any sense, because the Japanese
test is significantly different in this point from the
Lemon test.
533,

^"

Id.

at 542.

.

.

.
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be valid even though it has the purpose and effect to

promote or inhibit religion. ^^^

(2)

Matsumoto

v.

Technology Case)

Kobayashi (Kobe City College of

.^^'^

As mentioned above,

this is the first case in which

the Supreme Court of Japan dealt with religious

accommodation
The appellee was

Technology,

a

a

student of Kobe City College of
He was a serious believer

public college.

in the Jehovah's Witness faith.

Kobe City College

required its students to take physical training.

In fact,

since 1990, the college has adopted Kendo^^^ as a mandatory

program of training for the first year students.
the whole physical training class started,

Before

the appellee,

who believed that it was against his religious tenet to

practice Kendo, asked teachers of the college to submit
papers instead of participating classes of Kendo training.
The teachers denied his request, however, and said that
his lack of participation would be counted as absence from
the class if the appellee did not practice Kendo.

appellant, the principal of the college,

decision not to accommodate him.

The

finally made

a

The appellee did not

^^^

See Yokota, supra note 1, at 217 ("[taking into
account ^common sense of the society'
supports the views
of the majority [of society] over those of the
minority. ")
]

^^^

^^^

906 Hanrei Taimuzu 77

(Sup.

Ct.,

Mar.

8,

Kendo is Japanese style of fencing, or
swordmanship

1996).
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oversteps the limits of the discretion, or is
However, a
an abuse of the discretion.
decision of dismissal of a student from the
college is a crucial disposition which
[Thus,] the
deprives status of a student.
principal may choose the decision of
dismissal only when the exclusion of the
student is educationally compelling, and more
[The]
careful consideration is required.
is
invalid
clearly
decision at issue
as
inappropriate as in light of the common sense
of society, and has gone beyond the limits of
the discretion .^^^
In a college, practicing Kendo is not
It is possible to
said to be a requirement.
substitute to practice other sport to
accomplish the aim of physical training.
[It] is obvious that the appellee's
disadvantage was extreme, because he was
dismissed as a result of his refusal to
practice Kendo based on his religious belief,
though he had good grades in other courses.
Moreover, the decision in this case surely
was of a character which obliged the appellee
to practice Kendo, against his religious
tenet in order to avoid his extreme
disadvantage.
The decision itself did not
mandate to do what is against his religion
and did not directly restrict his free
exercise of religion.
[Since] the decision
had such features, the appellant had to
accommodate the appellee when the appellant
made decision as an exercise of discretion.
[Given] the characters of the decision, the
appellant should consider the proprieties,
manners, and conditions of substituting
measures for Kendo practicing, until it
finally gave the decision.
Nevertheless, we
can not say that the appellant took such
measures into account here.^^°

The appellant alleges that to take the
substituting measures would violate Article
^^^

Matsumoto,

906 Hanrei Taimuzu,

omitted'
^^°

Id.

at 80-81.

at 80

(citation
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20, paragraph 3 of the Constitution.
However, to give a grade in a physical
training course to a student who can not
participate in Kendo practice because of
religious reasons, asking, for instance, to
take another course of the physical training
instead of Kendo or to submit papers about
Kendo as substituting measures is not
regarded as the activity whose purpose has
religious meaning and whose effect supports,
promotes, and fosters a certain religion, or
oppresses and interferes with other religious
To take a
believers or non-believers.
substituting measure in any manner and
condition can not evidently be said to
It is not
violate Article 20, paragraph 3.
permitted in public schools to investigate or
look into students' belief, or to treat
However, it does not
religions unequally.
violate the requirement of religious
neutrality in public education to investigate
whether a student's refusal of to practice
Kendo is a pretext of indolence or has a
reasonable relation to serious religious
tenet. ^^^

The Supreme Court correctly understood that a

religious student was compelled to either to obey his own
religious teaching and thus be dismissed from the college,
or to participate in Kendo practice and violate his

belief.

As Justice Souter and Professor McConnell have

suggested, this is a circumstance in which religious

accommodation is needed,

^^^

though the Japanese Supreme

Court did not say that making people to confront with this

circumstance per se violates the Constitution.

The

Supreme Court compared the interest of the College in

requiring its students to practice Kendo with the student
^^^

Id.

^^^

See supra text accompanying notes 98,

at 81.

128-129

.
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interest in not participating in the class, as an exercise
The Supreme Court stated

of his constitutional right.

that since Kendo practice was not indispensable for the

purpose of physical training, denying the appellee's
religious right subjected him to an unreasonable
disadvantage.^''^

In so declaring,

the Supreme Court held

that the principal of the College would have had to

accommodate the student in this situation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court said that such an

accommodation did not violate the Constitution under the
"purpose-and-ef f ect" test.

It is true that,

given the

alternative burden, that is, to submit papers, the Supreme
As to the alternative

Court permitted the accommodation.
burden,

the Supreme Court left it to the principal's

discretion whether or not to take

a

substituting measure.

This seems to imply that the Supreme Court asked, or at

least recommended the government to take an alternative

burden in

a

case of accommodation to dilute its benefit to

religion over non-religion. ^^^

^^^

See Tomatsu Hodenori, Shiho Shinsa no Kijun
Shuju no Kenri no Hoshou, 191 Houkaku Kyousitsu 2 6, 27

(5):

(1996)
^^"^

No Jpanese commentator mentions the relationship
between religious accommodation and the alternative
burden, see e.g., Munesue Yasuyuki, Kendo Jutsugi no
Kyousei to Shinkyou no Jiyuu, 192 Houkaku Kyousitsu 94
(1996)
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C.

Analysis.
As we saw,

both Germany and Japan have adopted the

religious accommodation approach to some extent.

Both

countries permit religious believers to avoid serious

confrontation of their belief with the social order.
Interestingly, the two countries acknowledge that

government can impose alternative burden on the believers
for the price of the accommodation.

The German case^^^ tells us that even if the exemption
of conscientious objectors from military service is

required by the Basic law, government has discretion to
place an alternative burden on the objectors in order to

balance religion with non-religion.

It also teach us that

government may make the alternative burden much heavier
than the original burden unless the former burden

suppresses the free exercise of religion.
The Japanese case^^^ indicates that government can use
the alternative burden not only for conscientious

objectors, but also for other religious exemptions.

The

Japanese Supreme Court implied that government, or at
least

a

public college, should seek the possibility to

accommodate

a

religious student before it implements its

law or policy that imposes a serious burden on him.

^^^

See supra text accompanying notes 214-220

^^^

See supra text accompanying notes 264-271

CHAPTER

V.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.

Religious accommodation is used to alleviate

government-imposed burdens on religion.

One supposes that

the Free Exercise Clause requires government not to

restrain religious practices.

As the United States

Supreme Court stated, government "has not just the right
but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the

meaning and force of the Constitution

.

"^^^

This means that

government also has authority to interpret the

Constitution though the final word must belong to the
Permissible accommodation may be understood as

Court.

a

government interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
this sense, no reason can be found to draw

a

line between

an accommodation ordered by courts and that offered by

government.

This distinction makes no sense because any

accommodation must be reviewed under the limits of the
Establishment Clause.

In other words,

all of the

accommodations are required by the Constitution unless
they do not go beyond the limit. ^"^^

^^"^

(1997)

City of Boerne

v.

Flores,

Thus,

government may

117 S.Ct.

2157,

2171

.

^'^^

NowAK AND Rotunda, supra note 107, at 1220 ("[T]he
judicial examination of that legislative action will
involve a determination of whether the legislature's
promotion of free exercise values aided religion in a
manner that violated the establishment clause.").

71

In

72

expressly make an accommodation to religion and courts can
examine whether it violates the Establishment Clause.
As to the principle of reviewing accommodation,

the

Justices of the United States Supreme Court seem divided
in two positions:

the first follows American history,

tradition, and heritage; the second requires religious

neutrality
Court,

^''^

Neither principle is predominant in the

.

and both have their shortcoming,

as discussed in

The former principle could be unfair to minor

Chapter II.

and unpopular religion, while the latter asks government
to offer accommodation to even false claims in the name of

Since it seems impossible to settle on a single

religion.

principle to scrutinize the constitutionality of the
accommodation, the Court has to treat the problem on

case-by-case basis.

a

the Court may evaluate

For instance,

accommodation under American history, tradition, and
heritage in

a

drug consumption exemption case.

However, a

case of tax exemption may well be considered under

religious neutrality.

It may be better for the Court not

to select only one principle,

and to adopt either of them

depending on the character of the accommodation.
Based on this understanding,

I

types of religious accommodation.

permitted to offer
prison,
home.

a

a

chaplain or

military base, or

Second,

a

want to suggest four
First,

a

government is

worship place in

a

public hospital and nursing

government may confer accommodating

benefits on religious groups as well as secular
organizations.
^'^^

A property tax exemption which was upheld

See supra text accompanying notes 111-117

.
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Tax Comm'

in Walz v.

n^^°

government can exempt,

falls in this category.

from

Third,

generally applicable

a

religious believers who claim that the

requirement,

requirement is an obstacle to their religious practice.

military uniform

To exempt wearing Jewish headgear from

a

code is this type of accommodation.^®^

Students-initiated

prayer in

public school premise will be permitted in

a

this category if there is no peer pressure on those who do
not want to participate the prayer. ^^^
can also exempt from the requirement,

Finally,
a

government

religious claim of

certain believers against what the government requires its

people to do.

The conscientious objector exemption from

military service or exemption of religious children from
compulsory education falls into this category.
In the fourth category,

government has discretion to

impose an alternative burden on the believers for the

price of the accommodation.

As we saw in the cases in

Germany and Japan, government may require those who
receive the accommodating benefit to do substituting
service, which does not interfere with their religious

practice.

I

strongly suggest that government in the

United States should learn those lessons of Germany and
Japan to adopt the alternative burden in order to balance

religion over non-religion and to exclude false claimants

2®°

^^^

397 U.S.

See e.g.,

664,

669

(1970)

10 U.S.C.

§

.

774

^^^

(1988).

See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992)
("This [peer] pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be
as real as any overt complusion "
.

)

.

74

of religious accommodation.^"

One would argue that

because the United States is religiously more complicated
society than Germany and Japan, the examples of the

alternative burden can not be applied easily to America.
My answer is that the alternative burden reduces

disproportion not only between religion and non-religion,
but among religions.
that only Amish

Other religious believers will see

(Wisconsin

v.

Yoder)

or Jehovah's Witness

(Japanese Kobe City College of Technology Case)

receive an accommodative exemption.

frustration would be bigger in
society.

problem,

a

can

This sort of

religiously complicated

Since the alternative burden may solve this
it will be more useful in a religiously

complicated society.
Since government cannot charge fees for the free

exercise of religion,

^^^

it is impossible to impose the

alternative burden in the other categories.

There,

especially in the third category, those who seek the
accommodation engage in their religious practice which has
a

priceless meaning in itself.

speech,

Unlike the freedom of

they do not have any alternative means to express

their beliefs other than the practice.

The alternative

burden fits only the case the believers do not want to do

^^^

Some commentators have already suggested the
possibility of the alternative burden on the latter
reason, see supra note 149, 186-189.
^^^

Murdock V. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943)
("Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of
religion are available to all, not merely to those who can
pay their own way.")

75

what the government requires.

The decision on whether the

alternative burden is proportional to the accommodation
belongs to the judiciary.

Courts can assure that the

burden is substantially the same as that the believers
want to be exempted from.

Even though countries examined may differ in
attitude,

the accommodation to religion seems to be a

common phenomenon in facilitating religious liberty.
Truly,

the history of religious persecutions has made

freedom of religion one of the important reason for the

modern constitutional law to secularize government.
However,

rigid secularization of state may diminish

religious liberty.

There should be

a

middle ground where

government can accommodate religious liberty while it
remains secular.

One can say that giving accommodation

only to religion may lose the balance between religion and

non-religion.

burden in

a

To ensure the equality of benefit and

society, government can take the alternative

burden on religion as the price of the accommodation .'^^^

^^^

See supra text accompanying note 133.
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